Same for "network security" proxies that actually break security.
I don't necessarily disagree with all of Dan Geer's assertions, but I am unconvinced that regulation can overcome organizational stupidity.
This is... non-obvious to me. Anyone know what he means by this?
Cost cutting trumps ALL other concerns. It's the ruling class' irrevocable policy.
C'est la vie.
If you don't like it, start your own business that does better. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
I was expecting all kinds of experts to discuss how "this was expected" and "you should have done it another way" after the CS incident, while failing to understand why their monitor does not work when switched off.
I guess that a week in an active organization's secops team would show them how much more we are in control of what is happening on end-user devices today than it was 10 years ago. I wish them all the best in managing the security of a few dozens of thousands of machines with their knowledge about what cybersecurity could be like in an alternative world.
If the nigh monoculture of CrowdStrike didn't exist, and malicious behavior protection wasn't as consistent as a result, would the aggregate harm of multiple smaller bad events occurring over years be above or below the one-shot harm of CrowdStrike's screwup?
Maybe the answer is obvious if you have more context than I do, but to me it doesn't seem so obvious it can be taken for granted one way or the other.