I've only skimmed the paper, but I didn't find anything that would clearly distinguish between things that harm someone's reputation in a justifiable way, and things that harm it in an unjustifiable way. For example, if the CEO of a startup has previously been convicted multiple times for financial fraud, it would both hurt their reputation and be beneficial to potential investors to know this. But what if it's only one conviction? And a long time ago? It seems like the whole argument comes down to drawing this line, but I didn't see any real attempt to do so.

A lot of the impulse for this paper seems to be based around "the [claimed] right to a fresh start":

Moreover, if reputational interest is understood as a presumption of good standing, then there is another reason to prohibit true defamation, one that depends upon the presumption, namely what might be called the right to a fresh start. By “a fresh start,” I mean the right to have a misdeed from long ago eventually cease to be part of one’s current reputation, so that it ceases to have any impact on one’s life. ... The interest in a fresh start stands against this veritable life sentence—an interest, instead, in being treated as a new person, no longer associated with a misdeed from long ago.

Yes, if you grant that such a right exists, it might make sense to make it illegal to point out true facts about someone's past. And I can easily see why many individuals would want a "fresh start". But does society as a whole benefit from having such a right? I'm far from convinced that it should be any sort of universal right, and don't see any good way to define when it's applicable and when it's not. Are there good solutions for this problem somewhere?

The book excerpt is very interesting because it focuses on private individuals defamed by groups. It argues that bringing up true statements about these private individuals that occurred a long time ago is also defamation.

We see the opposite in public discourse. Mobbing private individuals is perfectly fine, criticizing organizations or their leaders (public figures) is punished harshly.

Organizations destroying the reputation of private individuals is also perfectly fine. Everyone believes the leaders and corrections or hints that the leaders are doubtful characters themselves are suppressed.

This is unfortunately how it works here in Sweden, and it's terrible.

Truth is really incredibly important and not having the freedom to speak truth one knows and which one feels are important is a tremendous imposition.

Ones reputation isn't like ones body parts-- but the truthful speech of the person who would speak against you, that's the true body part.

> In this way, one’s reputation, like one’s hand or one’s home, is an aspect or extension of oneself, at least insofar as damage to it suffices as a harm to oneself, quite apart from any further impact it might have. It is, in other words, inapt to ask, “Your reputation may have suffered, but how exactly did that hurt you?” There is also another important way reputation is an aspect of oneself: It is not primarily constituted by the voluntary acts of other people, like a store owner’s share of the consumer market or a school board candidate’s share of the electorate. Unlike purchases or votes, the appraisals of others that constitute their reputation do not reflect the appraisers’ choices—some decision to begin viewing the person this way or that—but are instead generally formed as natural, passive consequences of learning the relevant information.

If a tree falls and no one hears it, does it make a sound? I can only know about my reputation from the voluntary acts of other people. These actions may be more or less conscious, just like the choice to buy from a store or to vote for a candidate, but they are not "a passive consequence of learning the relevant information".

One point not covered but clearly understood tacitly by the author is that the representativeness of a fact degrades over time. While it may be true that someone did something 10 years ago, that fact may not be a true reflection of their character today. Thus a statement may be technically true, but practically false, and thus should be considered defamatory (under the modern American definition).

I think what this paper attempts to argue, distilled to its simplest form, is that revenge is not justified.

The act of tearing someone down purposefully, either with facts or non-truths, is almost always an act of revenge. Someone felt wronged by someone's current or previous actions, and they move to "take revenge." This paper essentially argues that no one is entitled to revenge.

Skimmed it, so perhaps I missed something, but what is the purpose of reputation if negative facts can never be incorporated into one’s reputation?

Seems like the harm caused to a person through true defamation is outweighed by the benefit to society of holding people to account for bad behavior.

TFA is difficult to read; because the author, having argued that "defamation" should include true but harmful remarks, proceeds to use the word "defame" as if that term included truthful utterances.

E.g., concerning Tilley: "Yet he was indisputably defamed by it". Yes, his reputation was harmed, so arguably he was defamed by 17thC standards; but "indisputably" is simply wrong on the present definition of "defame". If he was indeed a bad manager, then having that information in the public domain seems to be a social good; bad managers harm all of us, and this guy was trading on his reputation as a good one.

Instead of reviving defamation, we should introduce the right of rebuttal. The right of rebuttal should replace defamation and libel lawsuits. It's compatible with the freedom of speech and the first amendment.

Thoroughly wordy; this could have been 3 pages. Deeply unconvincing, to boot. (am I defaming the author by saying their writing sucks?) I'm more convinced "true defamation" is not defamation at all.

> as long as we understand the “opinions” involved in people’s reputation to be something formed more or less involuntarily as a consequence of receiving information being circulated about them.

What? Involuntarily? My opinions are certainly not formed involuntarily as a consequence of information. That's not something I can "understand".

One's reputation is not their property. How can my opinion be your property? Step off.

> It is wrong, all else equal, to knowingly damage an aspect of other people—like their face or their farm—in which they have strong interests.

No, it is not. If James Taylor has a strong interest in singing, it is not wrong to say he sings flat. It can be mean to criticize people for things they cannot change, but it's hardly wrong.

I don't think that defamation is the right lens to view the arguably legitimate cases here through, a better one may be harassment or privacy violation.

Whatever one's views on defamation before coming Helmreich's well-researched and well-argued paper it's highly doubtful that afterwards their views will remain unaltered.

Let's assume that if beforehand one agreed wholeheartedly with Helmreich's position—which I'd suggest would be unlikely—then I'd posit this paper would further nuance their views. This is an excellent and authoritative paper, and I have learned much about a subject of which I thought I already had reasonable knowledge.

This article, and I suspect much of "journal" it is published in, is an attempt to recast right-wing complaints about cancel culture into respectable legal language. Make it appear (in true right wing fashion) as if they are defending some time honored truth that has recently been corrupted.

I don't have the knowledge or scholarship to go point by point verifying or refuting the actual article, and it does bring up up a lot of interesting points.

But I beg you not to be suckered by academic phrasing, calls to the past or the mere length of the article. How we treat defamation should be based on what has the best outcomes for society today, and you should be able to come to you own conclusions about what a world where "true defamation" is prohibited would look like.